Scholars have long debated whether ownership structure matters for firm performance. The standard view with respect to Victorian Britain is that family-controlled companies had a detrimental effect on operating profit and shareholder value. Here, we examine this view using a hand-collected corporate ownership dataset. Our main finding is that it was not necessarily the broad structure of corporate ownership that mattered for performance, but whether family blockholders had a governance role. Large active blockholders tended to increase operating performance, implying that they reduced managerial agency problems. In contrast, we find that directors who were independent of large family owners were more likely to increase shareholder value.
The commonly accepted view amongst scholars is that in the Victorian and Edwardian eras family control of public companies resulted in British public companies performing poorly. It is alleged that they had amateurish and unsophisticated managers, and family owners were more interested in paying out a substantial proportion of company earnings as dividends rather than retaining funds to grow the business (Chandler, 1990, p. 240; Wilson, 1995, p. 154) . Indeed, some scholars have even attributed Britain's relative economic decline in the twentieth century to the problems with family-controlled companies (Elbaum and Lazonick, 1984; Chandler, 1990) . Hannah (2007) , Foreman-Peck and Hannah (2012) and Acheson et al. (2015) have challenged this conception or caricature of the UK's corporate economy in the Victorian and Edwardian periods as being dominated by family-owned public firms. These studies find that, in many cases, ownership was divorced from control. However, this separation of ownership from control may have created an agency problem, in that the executives of these public companies mismanaged them, and did not run them in the interests of shareholders. Notably, the diffuse ownership structure of British Victorian and Edwardian railways has been highlighted as a contributing factor to their poor performance (Crafts et al. 2007 (Crafts et al. , 2008 Mitchell et al., 2011) .
We contribute to this debate by examining the relationship between ownership structure and different measures of firm performance, using hand-collected data for 345
Victorian public companies. This unique dataset enables us to test whether diffuse, or family, ownership affected firm performance.
The idea that ownership structure affects corporate performance has a long academic pedigree. For example, in their classic study, Berle and Means (1932) argued that the separation of ownership from control created an incentive problem in that managers would not necessarily act in the best interests of owners.
1 Large blockholders, which we define as someone who owns 10 per cent or more of the company, may help to reduce this managerial agency problem because they have the incentive and power to monitor managers Vishny, 1986, 1997) . However, blockholders, in turn, may put their own interests ahead of those of minority shareholders (Chandler 1990, p. 292) .
Conceptually, directors who are independent of large owners could protect minority shareholders from expropriation by blockholders. However, the perception of boards of directors in the Victorian era is somewhat mixed. A contemporary judge believed that independent directors assured minority shareholders (Kennedy, 1987, p. 126) , whereas a contemporary legal writer saw independent directors as incompetent or pre-occupied (Chadwyck-Healey, 1884) or ornamental rather than playing any useful economic function (Campbell and Turner, 2011; Chandler, 1990, p. 242) .
Our findings imply that it is not ownership itself which mattered in Victorian Britain, but rather the interaction between ownership and control. Although broad ownership measures are unrelated to firm performance, the presence of large active family blockholders is associated with a better operating performance, as measured by a higher return on assets (ROA). A possible explanation for this is that large active family blockholders in Victorian
Britain effectively reduced managerial expropriation by helping to mitigate agency costs.
However, this does not translate into greater market values, as measured by Tobin's Q, possibly reflecting minority shareholders' fears of blockholder expropriation. 2 By way of contrast, the presence of directors who were not blockholders has little effect on operating 1 Lipartito and Morii (2010) question whether Berle and Means (1932) were concerned about the classic agency problem. Rather, they argue that that Berle and Means were more concerned about conflicts between blockholders. 2 Tobin's Q measures how investors value the company and is widely used as a performance measure in empirical corporate finance studies (Davies et al. 2005; Demsetz and Villalonga 2001) . It is the ratio of the market value of the company's common and preferred equity and debt to the book value of the company's assets.
performance but is associated with relatively higher market values. This implies that independent directors in Victorian Britain may have provided credible commitments against family blockholder expropriation, but were less effective at reducing managerial expropriation.
This article also contributes to the literature on the evolution of the UK capital market by looking at control of public companies following the liberalisation of incorporation law in 1856. 3 To date, the extant literature has focused on the performance and growth of the equity market (Grossman, 2002) , the expansion of the investor franchise (Rutterford et al., 2011) , and the development of stock exchanges (Thomas, 1973; Michie, 1999) . We contribute to the understanding of how the UK capital market transformed from one where shareholders had direct and personal knowledge of a company's operation and management to one where shareholders did not have such personal knowledge. Additionally, this paper augments studies which look at the ownership-performance nexus from an historical perspective. For example, Foreman-Peck and Hannah (2013) find that, for the largest UK companies in 1911, diffuse ownership did not operate against shareholders' interests, suggesting that agency problems were somehow reduced. 4 Examining corporate ownership structure in the Victorian era is enlightening for contemporary economists because the period under examination was one where the investor protection environment was very weak by modern standards (Campbell and Turner, 2011) .
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Since investor protection laws can affect ownership structure (La Porta et al., 1998 , 1999 , 3 On the liberalisation of incorporation law, see Cottrell (1980) and Taylor (2006) . 4 Hilt (2008) looks at New York corporations in the 1820s and finds that the voting power of management is negatively related to firm value. 5 Statutory companies registered under the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act (1845) scored five out of six in the La Porta et al (1998) anti-director rights index, (Foreman-Peck and Hannah (2015) . They are not included in this study. The Companies Act (1862) scored one out of six in the anti-director rights index. All of the companies in our study were registered under this legislation. Nevertheless, there is the possibility that companies registered under the 1862 Act voluntarily adopted anti-director rights in order to list on stock exchanges or attract capital from investors. (see Foreman-Peck and Hannah 2015) .
the Victorian period provides us with a natural experiment where we can observe the relationship between structure and performance in a laissez-faire company law regime.
BACKGROUND, HYPOTHESES AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

The liberalisation of incorporation in the UK
Prior to the liberalisation of incorporation law in the middle of the nineteenth century, the right to incorporate in the UK was controlled by Parliament and the Crown. From 1844 onwards, there were a series of acts which made incorporation, and limited liability, easier to obtain. The 1862 Companies Act saw a consolidation of existing pieces of legislation and was the capstone on the liberalisation process. The ownership and control of the companies incorporated under the 1862 Act and raised share capital from the market are the focus of this study.
Manager-owner conflict
Many of the companies incorporated under the 1862 Companies Act had diffuse ownership (Acheson et al. 2015) . Such a separation of ownership from control allows specialisation in share ownership (or residual risk-bearing) and in managerial control (Fama and Jensen, 1983) . With the liberalisation of UK incorporation law, this specialisation was available to every firm. However, this specialisation may give rise to an agency problem, in that managers pursue their own interests and do not act in the interests of shareholders (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Examples of managerial inefficiency in the late Victorian era have been highlighted by a number of authors looking at the railway industry (Arnold and McCartney, 2005; Crafts et al., 2008; Mitchell et al., 2011) . 6 A possible solution to the managerial agency problem may be provided by monitors who have the incentive to collect information about the firm, and the power to influence managers.
In this study, we categorise the key monitors into three groups: large active family blockholders, large passive blockholders, and directors who are not blockholders. A blockholder is a shareholder with more than 10%. We hypothesise that the presence of large active blockholders will reduce the conflict between managers and owners, and raise profitability as measured by Return on Assets (ROA). These large active blockholders have the incentive and the power to reduce managerial agency costs and raise operating profits.
They may run the firm on a day-to-day basis, or at least be closely involved in it, ensuring that all other managers and employees maximise their efforts, and minimise costs. On the other hand, large passive blockholders, with less involvement in the monitoring of managers will not have such an effect.
Directors who are not blockholders often have little impact on the manager-owner conflict. In dispersed-ownership companies, Fama and Jensen (1983) have argued that it is natural that the most influential members of the board will be internal managers as they have the most information about the firm, and they are also well placed to nominate outside directors. Alternatively, the directors may be independent of management, but they do not have the day-to-day involvement in the firm which would be required to reduce the agency problem. Their real influence would be at a strategic level, on major issues which came before the board, not on everyday issues.
To summarise, we use Return on Assets (ROA) as our measure of operating performance to show how efficiently a company uses its assets to earn a profit. The greater 6 Ownership data was not collected by the Registrar of Companies for statutory companies and therefore railways are not included in our sample.
the managerial expropriation, the lower the return on assets.. If large active blockholders can reduce managerial expropriation, then, ceteris paribus, ROA will be higher. On the other hand, large passive blockholders and directors who are not blockholders should have had no impact on ROA.
Blockholder-minority shareholder conflict
Although large active blockholders may be able to discipline managers, they may focus on their own interests and attempt to maximise these at the expense of minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . This introduces an additional risk factor which investors must consider in their valuations. If they are concerned about expropriation, then the high profitability earned in companies with large active blockholders may not necessarily translate into higher share prices. However, if investors feel protected from expropriation then they may reward the firm with a relatively higher valuation. The blockholder-minorityshareholder conflict generally concerns strategic decisions, rather than day-to-day management, and would be typically dealt with at board level. Consequently, having an independent board could help promote good practice and increase shareholder value. Boards with more directors who are not blockholders could be viewed as a commitment that there is a low risk of blockholder expropriation, as collusion would be much more difficult. The result is that, ceteris paribus, valuations (as measured by Tobin's Q) should be higher.
There were numerous ways in which blockholders could put their own interests before those of minority shareholders Firstly, the active blockholder could engage in tunnelling (or related party transations) 7 , by getting the company to lend money at low rates, or buy assets at inflated prices. These would typically affect only the balance sheet, rather than profitability, in the short-term. The potential for these abuses by large active blockholders, even if they did not materialise, raised the risks faced by minority shareholders. We hypothesise that even though large active blockholders may raise profitability (ROA), they do not necessarily raise firm value (Tobin's Q). Large passive blockholders, who have no effect on profitability, should have no effect on value, because they do not exercise enough power to engage in expropriation. However, having a board with many directors who are not themselves blockholders will significantly increase the value of the firm, as collusion on expropriation would be much more difficult. If their focus is on major strategic decisions, rather than the minutiae of day-to-day decisions, such directors may have little influence on profitability, but they can provide safeguards against systematic expropriation.
Empirical framework
We examine the relationship between the governance structure and performance of non-statuatory public companies in Victorian and Edwardian England. Our estimating equation takes the form
We use ROA and Tobin's Q as performance measures and dependent variable in our post-1880 performance sample. ROA is measured as:
and Tobin's Q is calculated as follows:
where MVEq = year-end market value of firm's common stock; Pref = year-end value of firm's preferred stock; Debt = year-end value of firm's total debt; and BV Assets = total assets of firm. Controls on age, size, location, growth, industry, ownership structure and corporate control measures are described in the next section.
The main threat to validity which has been identified in studies of ownership structure is that of causality: does ownership structure affect performance or performance ownership structure (Cho, 1998; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001 ). Demsetz and Villalonga (2001, p.221) argue that 'compensation plans, insider trading possibilities, and corporate takeovers suggest that firm performance may influence ownership structure as well as be influenced by it'.
However, there are several reasons to believe that reverse causality in a Demsetz and
Villalonga world was not a major issue in the Victorian context. Even if some related-party transactions or tunnelling could be seen as affecting compensation, directors in our firms were paid said salaries and performance related bonuses, none of which resulted directly in changes of ownership, unlike modern equity-based plans. Second, hostile takeover bids and accumulation of stakes by potential acquirers were very rare in this era (Cheffins 2008, p. 79; Hannah 1974; Hannah 1976, p. 150; Hannah 2011, p. 241) . Third, Braggion and Moore (2013) find that while insider trading was not illegal, it rarely happened (Braggion and Moore, 2013) . Fourth, institutional investors were very small players and typically only invested in fixed-interest securities such as corporate and government bonds, not equities (Cheffins, 2008, p. 190; Raynes, 1928) .
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Indeed, in the Victorian context, it was difficult for changes in ownership structure to occur quickly, as stock was often not as actively traded. 12 This meant that large one-off changes in ownership structure were not possible. We are not suggesting that blockholder changes were uncommon. However, it would have taken investors a long time to accumulate a block-holding stake in a company to fundamentally alter the ownership structure.
The absence of such mechanisms does not completely eliminate the reverse causality issue. One potential source of reverse causality is where a blockholder may be more likely to take a position on the board when companies are more profitable. In a robustness check, we find very little evidence of large passive blockholders rotating in or out of directorships, but we cannot conclusively rule this possibility out. However, it could be argued that blockholders might be more likely to take a seat on the board if profitability was low and the company was not performing well, in the hope of improving performance. A finding that active blockholders are associated with high profitability runs counter to what would be expected from results driven by endogeneity.
As an additional robustness check, we use a different measure of performance which should be less prone to the reverse causality problem, namely firm outcome. It seems plausible that ownership structure could affect the final status of the company. However, it is unlikely that the future state of the company would affect current ownership. Firm outcome differs from our other measures of performance, ROA and Tobin's Q, in that conceptually, we are measuring performance or success purely in terms of survival (Alchian, 1950) . We are posing the following two questions: (a) Was a specific type of ownership structure a survivable trait of firms over the long run? (b) Did a certain type of ownership structure make it more likely for a firm to fail for explicit performance reasons?
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Although reverse causality should not be a major issue in this analysis, there may be unobserved factors that jointly cause performance and ownership structure. There may also be issues in terms of whether certain conditions led to different ownership configurations. For example, a firm founder who was likely to obtain high rents, and therefore high ROA, may keep a large block of shares to extract as much value as possible. The founder of a firm with high capital expenditures, and who needed to repeatedly raise more capital from minority shareholders, would be more likely to initially configure the firm with independent directors.
For firms which were expected to be more successful, there may have been stronger demand for shares from subscribers, so that ownership became less concentrated. These issues mean that, ultimately, the most that we can say about any relationships we find is that they are correlations, and do not necessarily imply causality. delisted from the stock exchange from 1875 onwards with the reason for delisting. 16 We are able to trace the year of delisting as well as the ultimate fate of 344 companies.
Compared to the total population of publicly-quoted companies listed in BOI, our sample is a relatively small proportion. According to Essex-Crosby's data, there were 1,585
and 2,581 non-railway companies listed in 1885 and 1895 respectively (Jefferys 1977, p. 458) . In terms of the number of unique companies quoted in the COE and IMM between 1862
and 1901, we estimate that there were 2,664 companies excluding railways, quoted at some point during this period. In Appendix 1, we present a detailed breakdown of how our sample compares to non-railway companies listed in the IMM. The median par value of IMM firms in 1880 was £150,000 and in 1900 was £250,000. Our performance data sample firms have a median par value of £150,000, whilst our final status sample firms have a median par value of £133,099. Our sample is more weighted towards small and medium-sized public companies.
When compared to all of the non-railway companies in BOI, which included more of the small firms, our sample is fairly representative. The average paid-up capital of our companies for the ROA and Tobin's Q sample is £256,700, and for the final status sample is £216,560, which are similar to the average paid-up capital of non-railway companies in BOI in 1885 and 1895, which were £209,752 and £262,340 respectively (Jefferys 1977, p. 458 ).
There were some substantial changes in industrial composition during this period, as seen from Appendix 1, but the only industry which seems to be under-represented in our sample in both 1880 and 1900 is mining. The commercial and industrial sector, which consisted mainly of manufacturing and processing companies, is the largest sector in our sample, which is unsurprising since this was a growth sector in the stock market (Grossman 2002, p. 130) . In terms of those listed in BOI, our sample under-represents the commercial and industrial sector and over-represents banking. This is again unsurprising because banks were more likely than other companies to have a large shareholder base and have their shares traded on public markets, whereas industrial and commercial public companies were more likely to be small and not regularly traded.
Ownership variables
The richness of our data permits a wide variety of measures of ownership structure.
Following Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) , we looks at the ownership of the five largest shareholders as this may proxy the ability of shareholders to control managers. We can also construct a Herfindahl Index of ownership. We describe ownership by the board of directors as a whole, and of insiders which embraces both directors and blockholders. We then split this insider category into three types of individuals. Large active blockholders (i.e., individuals who owned more than 10 per cent of capital or voting rights and were on the board), large passive blockholders (i.e., individuals who owned more than 10 per cent of capital or voting rights and were not on the board), and directors who were not blockholders. The variables are described in Appendix 2.
<<Insert Table 1>> Summary statistics are presented in Table 1 (Campbell and Turner, 2011) .
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In Table 2 we describe how ownership by directors and large blockholders varies across industry. Four things are worthy of note. First, very few firms in any sectors had large blockholders. Second, there was a very small propensity for directors to be large blockholders, but a higher propensity (60.5 per cent) for large blockholders to be directors, which implies that the majority of such shareholders wanted to maintain control over the company. Third, the vast majority of directors were not blockholders, with the average board having 6.1 directors and, on average, 5.9 of these were not large blockholders. Fourth, there is some variation across industries in terms of the percentage of voting rights controlled by large blockholders, with breweries, iron, coal and steel companies, and industrial and commercial companies having higher blockholder ownership than other industries.
18
<<Insert Table 2>> Performance variables
As noted above the main performance measures are ROA and Tobin's Q. In our regression analysis, we winsorize each of the variables at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles to deal with outliers and use industry-adjusted Tobin's Q and industry-adjusted ROA whereby
Tobin's Q, and ROA are adjusted using industry averages as per the industrial sectors in Table 1 )
In terms of ex ante optimality for shareholders, if a firm were to disappear, the worst outcome would have been a court order to wind up, followed by a voluntary winding up. In the former, larger losses would usually have been incurred by shareholders, whereas the losses may not have been as severe in the case of a voluntary winding up. Removal from the stock exchange yearbook usually occurred because a firm had failed, which again suggests poor performance. The best outcome would be a merger. The extensive rationalisations and merger movements in many of the industries at the turn of the twentieth century (Sykes, 1926; Supple, 1970, pp. 273-96; Hannah 1974 Hannah , 1976 ) suggest that few mergers were for explicit performance reasons. Reconstruction of companies also does not necessarily imply performance issues with firms, and would lie between the best outcome (i.e., merger) and the worst outcomes (i.e., winding up or removal).
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We include two variables to capture governance and control, Board size (NumDir)
ranged from 3 to 23, with a mean and median of 6.0.
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Independence is captured by the number of directors who are not also large blockholders (DirOnlyNum) and ranges from 2 to 23, with a mean of 5.8 and median of 5.0 (See Table 1 ).
We include two time variables. First, the year in which the ownership census in our dataset was conducted, to capture a time effect (OwnDate). Second, we use the establishment year of the company to capture the maturity of the firm (EstDate). We control for firm size by including the natural logarithm of a firm's paid-up capital in our regressions (Size) and a leverage ratio (LTDebt).
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Since directors in this era were usually required to own a certain number of shares, which was usually low relative to the capital of the firm (Campbell and Turner, 2011) , we include a director qualification variable (DirectorQual) because this may have affected the relationship between ownership and performance. The mean, median, and range suggests that director qualifications were not a high proportion of the firm's par (paid-up) capital.
Indeed, on average, 29.3 per cent of shareholders had enough shares to qualify as a director.
We also control for whether or not a firm had London headquarters because such firms may have had greater access to capital markets and oversight by professional investors (HeadLondon). As our data comes from two different archives, we control for any possible effect this might have on the relationship between ownership and performance by including a binary variable which takes the value of one if our firm was Scottish, zero otherwise. In our regressions where ownership is regressed on Tobin's Q, we also control for the return on 21 After removal of 1 st and 99 th percentiles 22 The mean and median leverage ratios in Table 1 are low compared to the Essex-Crosby data for all companies listed in BOI in 1885 and 1895, where the respective averages are 20.7 and 29.0 per cent (Jefferys 1977, p. 458) . There are at least two reasons for this. First, we have an over-representation of banks and other financial companies which did not have long-term debt in their capital structure. Second, some public companies, such as breweries, issued only debentures to the public and are therefore not in our sample, but are included in the Essex-Crosby figures. assets (ROA), allowing us to analyse the determinants of firm value after controlling for differences in operating performance.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OWNERSHIP AND PERFORMANCE Table 3 contains pairwise correlations between our performance and ownership variables. Although there is a positive correlation between Q and ROA, they are not highly correlated, suggesting that they are measuring different aspects of firm performance. Second, ActiveBlock is positively correlated with ROA, implying having directors with more than 10 per cent of the capital are associated with higher accounting profits. Third, there is a positive correlation between Tobin's Q and DirOnlyNum, implying that boards with more directors who are not also large blockholders are associated with a higher Tobin's Q.
In Table 4 , we show the results for various specifications of voting concentrations on ROA (panel A) and Tobin's Q (panel B). VoteLargest5 and VoteHHI, are uncorrelated with ROA implying that ownership structure, in a very broad sense, is unrelated to operating performance as measured by ROA. However, the positive coefficient on the VoteDir variable, which remains even when control variables are introduced, suggests that greater ownership in the hands of directors is associated with higher ROA. In panel B, we find a suggestion of a negative relationship between the broad ownership measures and Tobin's Q, but only one of the ownership measures is weakly significant.
<<Insert Tables 3 & 4 >>
The results also reveal that NumDir (board size) has little effect on ROA, but a highly significant positive effect on Q. One interpretation is that larger boards may have acted as a check on large blockholders expropriating minority shareholders, and was therefore valued by them. Overall these results imply a complex relationship between ownership by large shareholders, ownership by directors, and the number of directors.
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To analyse the interaction between these factors more precisely, each insider is categorised as either an active blockholder, a passive blockholder, or a director who was not a blockholder. We begin with a simple difference-in-means test between companies with and without each type of blockholder, and above and below median numbers of individuals who were solely directors. (See Table 5 ). We classify a blockholder as having 10 per cent of voting rights, but since our findings may be sensitive to this definition, we check the robustness of our results using 5 and 20 per cent levels. (see Holderness, 2009 Holderness, , p. 1399 . The ROA for companies with at least one active blockholder is statistically and economically greater than that for companies without, irrespective of what definition of large blockholder we use. In addition, Tobin's Q for companies with above median number of individuals who were solely directors is statistically greater than that for companies below the median for all three definitions. 24 <<Insert Table 5>> In Tables 6 and 7 , we refine our analysis of the interaction between performance and governance. The most noteworthy finding in Table 6 is the positive and statistically significant coefficient on ActiveBlock, which implies that firms with blockholders who are also directors perform better in terms of ROA than other firms. The coefficient on ActiveBlock suggests that a one per cent increase in the votes of active blockholders increases ROA by about 0.3 per cent. This is consistent with the idea that such owners have the incentives and power to make sure than the firm is efficiently run to produce a high ROA.
Previous research has indicated that the relationship between ownership and performance may be non-linear (Morck et al., 1988 and Servaes, 1990 ), so we include a squared term (ActiveBlockSq). The results indicate that ActiveBlockSq is significant and negative, indicating that active blockholder ownership is beneficial up to a point, but may become less useful at very high levels. Differentiating and solving suggests that the optimum level of active blockholder ownership is 27.1 per cent. Because the difference between voting rights and cashflow rights may be influential (Claessens et al., 2002 and Gompers et al., 2009 ), we include the ActiveCashWedge variable, which calculates cashflow rights minus voting rights for active blockholders. This is not significant. In robustness regressions, reported later, we find that using capital concentration does not change the results.
We go further, attempting to determine whether the active blockholders were fulfilling the role of the primary manager, essentially acting as a CEO. 25 We assume that
Chairman fulfils the role of a modern CEO, unless another Managing Director (MD) is named in which case that person is seen as CEO. In our sample, we have 34 firm-years with active blockholders where either the Chairman and/or MD is named. Of these, in 18 firmyears the role of CEO was taken on by the active blockholder. These could be thought of as family firms, where the largest owner was also the manager. To investigate their impact on performance, we split our ActiveBlock variable into two parts, ActiveCEOBlock and ActiveNotCEOBlock, and re-run the regressions (see column 7 of Table 6 ). We find that both have a similar positive and significant impact on ROA.
<<Insert Tables 6 & 7>> Despite the positive impact that active blockholders have on ROA, there appears to be an insignificant relationship between ActiveBlock and Tobin's Q, ( Table 7 ), implying that minority shareholders do not value having a large blockholder who is also a director. The coefficient on the PassiveBlock variable suggest that large shareholders who do not take on a monitoring role have little effect on performance or firm value.
Having directors who are not blockholders (DirOnlyNum) has no effect on ROA, but it has a positive and significant effect on Tobin's Q, which implies that the number of directors who are not blockholders matters. The size of the coefficient implies that adding one more independent director increases Tobin's Q by about 0.03 (See Table 7 ). This would imply that a company which started with the average Tobin's Q of 0.94 could increase it to 0.97, meaning that firm value would rise by about 3.2 per cent by adding another independent director. This finding is consistent with the view that an independent board may play a role in constraining large blockholders from expropriating small shareholders.
We also reformulate our DirOnlyNum variable into two parts, with variables for both the total number of directors (NumDir) and the proportion of the board who are active blockholders (PropDirBlock). This approach may suffer from a multi-collinearity problem as the correlation between ActiveBlock and PropDirectorsBlock is 0.857. The issue is similar if we use the proportion of directors who are not blockholders, just the direction of correlation is reversed. The results suggest again that having a greater number of directors is significantly and positively related to Tobin's Q (see column 8 of Table 7 ) which is consistent with the view that collusion is more difficult in larger groups. Having a larger board appears to make it more challenging to expropriate shareholders.
The ActiveCashWedge variable, which had no effect on ROA, does not have a significant impact on Tobin's Q. These results are interesting because they suggest that voting rights that limited the power of large shareholders might not have been important covariates of valuation. One potential explanation is that most company constitutions permitted voting at AGMs to be by a show of hands and the complicated voting weights would only be applied if specifically requested, which may have somewhat attenuated the power of voting schemes which limited the power of large shareholders. In addition, there was a rapid decline in AGM attendance in Victorian Britain (Jefferys 1977, p. 396) , which may have further blunted the power of voting schemes. The lack of influence of voting powers stands in contrast to the positive impact of independent directors. This is likely because it was the directors who were responsible for making almost all strategic decisions, with a vote at a company meeting usually only called to ratify what the directors had suggested.
We carry out a series of robustness checks using alternative cutoff levels for a large blockholder. We consider cutoff points at the 5, 10 and 20 per cent levels, using both voting concentration and capital concentration measures. In Table 8 and an average increase in Tobin's Q of 0.10. These results are exactly in line with our hypotheses and our empirical results. However, given the small sample sizes, we do not want to put too much emphasis on these findings. Our results are robust also to the exclusion of banks and insurance companies.
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As noted earlier, we use the final status of the company as a dependent variable to carry out a further robustness check. . We use multinomial logit regressions to examine how ownership affects the ultimate fate of the company. The results shown in Tables 10 and 11 reveal whether ownership structure made a company more or less likely to experience a 26 Contact authors for results. particular outcome, relative to the base outcome which we have chosen as merging with another firm.
The first thing to note from Table 10 is that there is little statistical or economic relationship between broad ownership structure, as measured by VoteHHI, and the final status of the company; only VolWoundUp is significant and only at the 10 per cent level. Using different measures of ownership structure, give similar results and are not reported separately.
The proportion held by insiders (VoteInsiders) is only significant against VolWoundUp, whilst the proportion held by the five largest shareholders (VoteLargest5), or by directors (VoteDir), are not significant predictors of any outcome. The negative coefficient on NumDir in specifications 2 and 3 suggests that the greater the number of directors a company had, the less likely they were to be wound up by a court, or to be removed from the stock exchange.
<<Insert Tables 10 & 11>> In Table 11 we examine the interaction of final status and director/blockholder interactions. We find negative coefficients on the DirOnlyNum variable for those companies whose ultimate fate was to be wound up by a court or removed from the stock exchange year book, implying that the greater the number of directors who were not large blockholders, the less likely that the company was to experience failure. In addition, the presence of large active blockholders is correlated with a lower probability of a company experiencing a negative ultimate outcome, although the coefficient on the ActiveBlock variable is only significant at the 10 per cent level. This would again suggest, consistent with the previous results, that the presence of a large active blockholder may have a positive influence on how the firm operates.
We conducted a survival analysis to examine if any of the governance variables had an impact on how long the company survived independently. However, none of the governance variables were significant, possibly because a large proportion of our sample companies ended by merging with another firm, or being acquired. This makes it difficult to interpret survival time, as companies which merged quite early did not necessarily have poor performance.
In summary, the results suggest that the presence of someone who is both a large shareholder and a director is associated with a higher ROA and less likelihood of experiencing a negative future state, but it does not result in a higher Tobin's Q. This implies that large active blockholders alleviate managerial agency problems and have a desire for survival in the long run, but their presence is not necessarily valued by other shareholders.
Second, the number of directors who are not large shareholders is positively correlated with a higher Tobin's Q and a lower probability of failure in the long run, which may imply that they were effective at preventing expropriation by large shareholders.
CONCLUSION
This paper has addressed the debate of whether ownership structure mattered for firm performance in Victorian Britain. Our basic finding is that it was not the broad structure of corporate ownership which mattered for the performance of Victorian public companies, but whether a family blockholder had a governance role. Our results suggest that large family blockholders who were directors ensured that firms were well run and alleviated managerial agency problems. However, minority shareholders in Victorian Britain appear not to have placed a high value on such firms, possibly because of the potential threat of expropriation.
Indeed, minority shareholders seemed to prefer boards dominated by independent directors and not by large shareholders. This implies that independent directors played a useful economic function in Victorian Britain and were not just ornamental.
Firms dominated by family blockholders were relatively uncommon before the 1890s, as many public companies launched on the stock market from scratch before that time.
However, blockholders became much more common from the 1890s onwards as the newlylisted firms in this era were typically conversions of long-established firms, which had previously been partnerships (Acheson et al., 2015; Cheffins, 2008, p. 181) . The implications of this change in the nature of stock-market flotation for British capital markets and economic development are something to be addressed in future research. (1885) (1886) (1887) (1888) (1889) (1890) (1891) (1892) (1893) (1894) (1895) (1896) (1897) (1898) (1899) (1900) (1901) (1902) . Notes: The propensity for a director to be a large blockholder is calculated as (ActiveBlockholder)/(Solely Director + ActiveBlockholder) and the propensity for a large blockholder to be a director calculated as (ActiveBlockholder)/(Passive Blockholder + Active Blockholder). Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variables are industryadjusted ROA and Q. All outliers have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Notes: These are the results from a multinomial logit regression which has the final status or ultimate fate of the company as a dependent variable and where we have one observation per company rather than one observation per ownership sample. Companies which merged are taken as the base group. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and the pseudo R-squared = 0.139. Notes: These are the results from a multinomial logit regression which has the final status or ultimate fate of the company as a dependent variable and where we have one observation per company rather than one observation per ownership sample. Companies which survived are taken as the base group. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and the pseudo R-squared = 0.153.
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